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Capital reserve policy, regulation and credibility in insurance
Renaud Bourle`s1,2 and Dominique Henriet 1,3
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyze the need for capital and default regula-
tion in insurance. Proponents of deregulation argue that these requirements are
useless as insurers would hold enough capital as soon as the insured are fully
informed about their default probability. Adding to the purpose the relationship
between an insurer and her security holders (that is the issuance and dividend
policy) we show that the second best capital reserve decided by the security
holders is suboptimal whenever the return on cash inside the firm is smaller than
outside. Because of limited commitment on recapitalization, disclosure of infor-
mation may not be enough. Given these characteristics, State commitment to
recapitalize could be an alternative regulation policy.
Subject headings: insurance, capital reserve, regulation, recapitalization
1. Introduction
Is capital regulation necessary, and, if so, which kind is the most accurate? In all
countries that have insurance markets, regulation of insurance companies exists. The main
motivation of such a regulation seems to be the protection of insurance buyers against the
risk of insolvency of their insurers. This regulation generally takes the form of ”technical”
or ”mathematical” reserves that insurers should at least carry in sufficiently liquid capital.
These regulatory reserves are expressed as ratios of premium income and claims expenses. We
want to focus in this paper on the necessity and the economic motivations of such regulation
rules.
1GREQAM.
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The first rationale for capital regulation seems to be the potential asymmetry of infor-
mation between insurers and policyholders. The buyer of insurance pays a premium against
the promise that she will receive a payment if specified random events occur. If the insurer
does not hold enough reserves to fulfill this promise, the consumer is being cheated ex ante.
This potential failure, itself, undermines the confidence on which the market is based. If the
policyholders does not observe this default risk, the insurance market faces a typical ”lemons
problem” : uncertainty about product quality – here solvency – may drive high-quality firms
out of the market. Regulation is then intended to make sure that only ”good” firms (with
low risk of insolvency) are in the market.
Proponents of deregulation however argue that capital requirement is not an appropriate
tool to mitigate this adverse selection problem. As the problem arises because insured are
not conveniently informed about the risk of insolvency, ”disclosure of information” policy,
that is the public provision of information about insurers’ risk of insolvency, is sufficient
to solve the adverse selection issue. Private incentives are then sufficiently high to induce
companies to hold enough liquid capital to optimally reduce the risk of insolvency.
Such a reasoning is however silent on other key actors of insolvency: shareholders or debt
owners. Indeed, for a company to become insolvent, not only capital has to be insufficient to
meet claims but it also has to be suboptimal to recapitalize (or impossible to issue debt). In
the present paper we therefore want to focus on possible other reasons of capital regulation,
beside the relation ”insurer/insured” evoked above. Another bilateral relationship – between
the insurer and her security holders – indeed seems to be of interest. It is now well established
that agency problems may arise from the asymmetry of information between managers and
shareholders. For example, managers can invest in inefficient projects that generate private
benefits for them to the detriment of shareholders. Such an issue would therefore give security
holders an incentive not to leave capital in the insurance company. The problem becomes
clearer in presence of frictional capital market, if we assume that issuing new debt is costly.
An interesting trade-off then arise between agency cost and recapitalization cost.
To study these mechanisms we build a dynamic model of insurance and analyze the
dynamic of capital through the behavior of security holders. On the one hand, when the
company is solvent, that is when assets are sufficient to meet claims, the security holders
can either take dividend or issue new debt (or shares). On the other hand, if claims are too
large for the current assets to cover it, the security holders choose whether to recapitalize
the insurance company or to default.
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When the capital market is frictionless, that is when issuing new debt is costless, the
optimal strategy consists in taking dividend as long as it is possible – because of agency cost
– and to recapitalize each time it is needed (provided the future value of the company is
larger than the invested capital). However, if issuing new debt is costly, it can be optimal
to leave some capital in the company. The optimal strategy can be, by the way, related to
a well-known policy in inventory management: take dividend above a bottom limit, neither
take dividend nor issue new debt if the ex-post (capital) stock is positive but below the
limit and issue new debt in order to meet claims when the current reserve is insufficient.
Taking into account the effect of default on policyholders, we show that the first best policy
implies – when recapitalization is costless – no default (shareholders always recapitalize) but
no capital reserve. Although this dynamic is a good candidate for a complete information
competitive equilibrium, it appears to be hardly implementable. Indeed, it implies an ex-
ante commitment to recapitalize which is not credible. An efficient regulation would then
consist in making this commitment credible or at least in guaranteeing that the company
would always hold enough capital to continue operating. It therefore appears that State
commitment to recapitalize can be a more efficient regulation than capital requirement.
Our work fits in the literature on capital reserve and solvency in insurance. Initiated
by Borch (1981) in a model where shareholders can only invest in capital during the first
period, this literature has then developed in analyzing the optimal dynamic choice of capital.
Munch and Smallwood (1981) and Finsinger and Pauly (1984) for example analyze capital
choices in a situation where the demand for insurance is elastic with respect to default risk.
Both papers however assume that shareholders cannot recapitalize after claims are realized.
In a more recent paper, Rees, Gravelle and Wambach (1999) study a situation in which
policyholders are fully informed of the default probability of their insurer. They show that,
whereas an unconstrained insurer will optimally choose a corner solution (either zero or
maximum), once the insured is informed about the probability of not being indemnified,
the insurer’s expected value is higher if it holds the maximum amount of capital. They
however ignore the possibility of recapitalization when claims exceed assets. They indeed
assume that contracts are not fully honored in these cases. Under this assumption insurers
can commit on a default probability through their capital reserve. Being informed of the
amount of capital their insurer holds, individuals can infer the probability of not being paid.
Competition in insurance market then lead the companies to raise the maximum amount of
capital. However, as we introduce recapitalization – that is the possibility to reinject capital
when claims exceed assets – this mechanism no longer holds. Insurers then cannot commit on
a default probability as they cannot commit on the behavior of their security holders. This
creates a motive for an internal solution for capital reserve and therefore a room for capital
regulation (minimal capital requirement or State guarantee) if this solution is suboptimal.
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Blazenko, Parker and Pavlov (2007, 2008) analyze the concept of ”economic ruin” by
modeling a situation where new share can be issued in case of capital deficit. They however
assume an exogenous dividend policy in the sense that a fixed return (the risk-free interest
rate) is paid to shareholders whenever capital is positive and that insurer can continue
operating with negative capital (debt). We however want to focus here on optimal (and
therefore endogenous) issuance and dividend policy and we assume that shareholders has to
recapitalize a company with negative capital if they want the company not to default. Finally,
we want to focus on a different regulation scheme than Blazenko, Parker and Pavlov (2007,
2008). They indeed consider a regulation that requires an immediate capital contribution to
offset a capital deficit when we model regulation as capital requirement or State guarantee.
The sequel of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section (Section 2) we present
the model of dynamic insurance and its implication on the optimal issuance and dividend
policy under different setting (private/public optimum, costly/costless capital). Such an
approach allows us to capture the need for capital regulation and to analyze in Section 3 the
efficiency of two forms of regulation: capital requirement and State guarantee. Conclusions
and directions for future research are eventually provided in Section 4.
2. The model
An insurance company has a portfolio of n policyholders. Each policyholder incurs a
loss x˜i. We suppose that the random variables x˜i are IID and denote by x˜ the total claim.
We note f the distribution of claims, F its CDF and e its expectation.
Policyholders are completely insured. They value wealth through a von Neumann,
increasing and strictly concave, utility function u.
We consider a discrete dynamic model with infinite horizon. The company holds a
capital K ≥ 0 so that total assets at the beginning of the first period amounts to npi + K
where pi is the premium payed by insured.
For sake of simplicity, we will assume that claims occur at the beginning of the period.
Two cases are possible.
• In the first case, the total claim x˜ is lower than total assets A = (npi +K). Shareholders
of the company can the recapitalize or take dividends for the following period. Let
k(x) the amount of recapitalization (if negative , −k(x) is the amount of dividends).
For the following period, the insurance company begins with a new cash reserve that
amounts to : ρ(A− x+ k(x)), where ρ is the return on the cash left in the company.
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• In the second case the total claim x˜ is larger than A = (npi +K) and the company is
potentially insolvent. The security holders can either refuse to keep on operating —in
that case insured are not fully indemnified and A is simply equally shared between
them—or subscribe to an issue of new securities (shares or debt) to meet the claims.
We suppose that there is a potential cost of issuance : 1 dollar of fresh capital in the
company costs γ ≥ 1 to the security holders. This can be, for example, explained by
transaction costs (see Gomes 2001 for a justification and an evaluation of these costs).
Notice that there is no possibility of negative balance sheet. If x˜ is larger than A the
company must either stop or issue new shares or debt.
In the paper we describe the optimal policy of the insurer in alternative frameworks
(private behavior, perfect information framework, and credible policy). We suppose that
shareholders discount future with a discount rate δ. We make the assumption that δρ < 1.
Inside cash has a lower return ρ than outside opportunities δ−1.There is no direct incentive to
leave cash in the company since it has a better return outside. For instance, firms’ managers
may commit inside cash to inefficient projects that generate only private benefits for them to
the detriment of outside security holders (see La Porta et al. 2000 for an overview of these
problems).
The trade off between issuance and agency costs can either lead to solutions where
capital reserves are optimally positive (if issuance costs are large) or to situations where no
cash optimally remain in the insurance company.
2.1. Security holder’s private policy
2.1.1. The frictionless case
In a frictionless world, fresh cash has no opportunity cost : γ = 1. We claim that, because
of agency costs, the optimal policy is to maintain liquidity to zero and stop the activity when
losses are too large. To show that, we are considering the optimal intertemporal decision of
shareholders of a company starting with an initial capital K. In this part we consider that pi
is fixed. Notice that, in this section, we do not allow policyholders to leave their company.
Let V ∗(K, pi) the intertemporal optimal value of the company.
Using the Bellman principle, we have :
V ∗(K, pi) = max
I,k(x)≥x−A
∫
I
[δV ∗(ρ (A− x+ k(x)) , pi)− k(x)] f(x)dx, (1)
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where I is the range of the values of x for which security holders decide to keep on
operating.
A simple change of variables gives :
V ∗(K, pi) = max
I,H(x)≥0
∫
I
[
δV ∗ (H(x), pi)− 1
ρ
H(x) + (K + npi)− x
]
f(x)dx (2)
In the above equation H(x) is the reserve decided for the next period by the security
holders. As we do not allow the company to operate with negative cash reserve (short term
debt), H(x)has to be positive.
Setting then arg max
H≥0
(δV ∗(H, pi) − 1
ρ
H) = H∗ and max
H≥0
(δV ∗(H, pi) − 1
ρ
H) = δW ∗, the
equation 2 becomes :
V ∗(K, pi) = max
I
(∫
I
(δW ∗ +K + npi − x) f(x)dx
)
(3)
By the envelop theorem we have, noticing I∗ as the optimal range of operating, V ∗
′
K (K, pi) =
µ(I∗) (where µ is the measure associated with F ). This implies, as δρ < 1,that δV ∗(H, pi)−
1
ρ
H is a strictly decreasing function of H, which in turn implies that H∗ = 0.
It is optimal to leave no cash reserve in the company. Even if δρ = 1,that is even when
cash has the same return inside and outside, H∗ = 0 is an (now possibly non unique) optimal
solution.
We can then deduce the optimal range I∗. It is optimal to keep on operating until the
integrand of 3 is positive. We have hence I∗ = (0, b∗(K)) , where b∗(K) = K + npi + .δW ∗.is
the default threshold.
The optimal policy can therefore be depicted as follows.
-
xA npi + δW ∗0
-ﬀ -ﬀ -ﬀ
take dividends issue shares or debt default
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If we note eK = E(x/x ≤ b∗(K)), we can write the complete solution :
δV ∗(0, pi) = δW ∗ = δ
F (b∗(0))(npi − e0)
1− δF (b∗(0))
The value of the company holding K and pricing pi is hence :
V ∗(K, pi) = F (b∗(K))
(
K + (npi − eK) + δF (b
∗(0))(npi − e0)
1− δF (b∗(0))
)
(4)
with eK , b
∗(K),solutions of :

(1− δF (b∗(0))) b∗(0) + δF (b∗(0))e0 = npi
F (b∗(K))eK =
∫ b∗(K)
0
xf(x)dx
b∗(K) = b∗(0) +K
(5)
On the following picture we represent in the plane (b,W )the functions W =
∫ b
0
(b −
x)f(x)dx, b = npi + δW and W = b− e. The intersection between the first two curves is the
point b∗(0),W ∗, the intersection between the two lasts gives W = npi−e
1−δ which is the present
value of the firm when it is systematically recapitalizes (never default). Obviously this value
is smaller than W ∗.
[Figure 1 about here.]
As V ∗′K (K, pi) = F (b
∗(K)) and V ∗′′KK(K, pi) = f(b
∗(K)) ≥ 0, The value function is in-
creasing and convex. The asymptote for large K is K + (npi − e) + δV ∗(0, pi) = K + (npi −
e) +
δF (b∗(0))(npi − e0)
1− δF (b∗(0)) . The following picture gives the shape of V as a function of K.
[Figure 2 about here.]
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The optimal strategy is the following : at the first period, shareholders take away all the
money left if any, or reinject enough capital to meet claims. Then the liquidity is maintained
to zero except when the total claim exceeds
δF (b∗(0))(npi − e0)
1− δF (b∗(0)) + (K + npi). This value is
exactly the present value of the firm computed with the ”modified” discount factor δF (x∗(0))
that takes into account the probability of default. This simply means that security holders
refuse to put more money than the present value of future returns.
It is worth noticing that the value of a firm holding K and pricing pi, V ∗(K, pi) is larger
than the one obtained for a company that would adopt the non optimal strategy I = [0,+∞),
for which the value is simply equal to the NPV : K +
npi − e
1− δ .
With this optimal strategy from the point of view of security holders, the level of utility
achieved by the consumer as long as he stays in the company is :
B(K, pi) = (u(w − pi) + δB(0, pi))F (b∗(K)) +
∫ +∞
b∗(K)
u
(
w +
K − x
n
)
f(x)dx
The above result must be contrasted with the ones obtained by Rees, Gravelle and
Wambach (1999) In their model default is exogenous : if assets A are at least enough to
meet claims, then the insurer remains in business and receives a continuation value V that
is the expected present value of being in the insurance business at the end of the first
period. If claims costs turn out to be greater than assets,the insurer pays out his assets
and defaults on the remaining claims, losing the right to the continuation value. In this
framework, they find that it can be optimal, for the insurer, to put enough initial capital to
avoid default, provided that insurance claims distributions belong to the class of “increasing
failure rate” distributions on a bounded support. This result seems to be questionable since,
in particular, there is no reason to assume that cash or assets must be put ex-ante and that
ex-post recapitalization is impossible. This feature can, by the way, lead to accumulate ex
ante a huge (and potentially infinite) level of capital up to the maximal value of total claims.
It is as if there was an infinite cost of recapitalization and a zero cost of initial capital.
We obtain here a more nuanced result : default is endogenous and optimally decided
when new capital needed is too large compared with the expected returns. This leads to a
policy where permanent capital is useless. The only reason for permanent cash to be useful
would be the case where recapitalization is costly.
In the following section we will introduce a (finite) cost of issuing new debt or shares.
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2.1.2. Opportunity cost of recapitalization
In this second part we assume that capital market imperfections make issues of new
shares (or new debt) costly : γ > 1. In particular, when cash reserve becomes negative
security holders have to choose between issuing new shares and to stop operating. The
important consequence is that this cost creates an ex ante incentive to some precautionary
policy which takes the form of capital reserves. Intuitively, when γ is low, reserves can
be maintained to zero . But when γ becomes larger, it turns to be optimal to hold some
permanent strictly positive capital.
Suppose that shareholders can recapitalize when needed, and inject k(x) in the firm
at a cost γ > 1. When k is negative, that is when shareholders take dividends, there is no
opportunity cost.
The optimal value of the firm holding Kand pricing pi becomes :
V (K, pi) = max
k(x)≥x−A, I
min
α(x)∈{1,γ}
∫
I
[δV (ρ (A− x+ k(x)), pi)− α(x)k(x)] f(x)dx, (6)
In the above equation, α(x) is optimally fixed to γ for x such that k(x) ≥ 0 and to 1
elsewhere.
Setting, as previously, H(x) = ρ (A− x+ k(x)) this equation becomes :
V (K, pi) = max
H(x)≥0,I
min
α(x)∈{1,γ}
∫
I
[
δV (H(x), pi)− α(x)1
ρ
H(x) + α(x) (K + npi − x)
]
f(x)dx
(7)
Therefore α∗(x) = 1 if H(x) ≤ (A− x)and α∗(x) = γ if H(x) ≥ (A− x) .
Let set H∗ = arg max
H≥0
(
δV (H, pi)− 1
ρ
H
)
and H∗γ = arg max
H≥0
δV (H, pi)− γ
ρ
H.
The two levels of capital H∗ and H∗γ have the following meanings : the optimal strategy
consists in taking all cash reserves above H∗ if any, and to recapitalize up to H∗γ when needed.
As previously, set : max
(
δV (H, pi)− 1
ρ
H
)
= δW ∗ and max
(
δV (H, pi)− γ
ρ
H
)
= δW ∗γ .
Lemma 1 : 0 ≤ H∗γ ≤ H∗ and W ∗γ ≤ W ∗
– 10 –
Proof. see appendix
It is now easy to state the following proposition which gives the optimal strategy and
the value of the firm.
Proposition 1 The optimal cash policy is given by two optimal thresholds a∗(K) ≤ A ≤
b∗(K) such that :
if x ≤ a∗(K), H(x) = H∗ : take money above H∗
if a∗(K) ≤ x ≤ A,H(x) = ρ (A− x) : neither take money nor issue shares
if A ≤ x ≤ b∗(K), H(x) = H∗γ = 0 : issue shares up to H∗γ = 0
if x ≥ b∗(K) the company defaults.
where a∗(K), b∗(K), and V (K, pi), are solutions of :
V (K, pi) = max
a≤A≤b
∫ a
−∞
[δW ∗ + (K + npi − x)] f(x)dx
+
∫ A
a
δV (ρ (K + npi − x) , pi)f(x)dx
+
∫ b
A
[δV (0, pi) + γ (K + npi − x)] f(x)dx
Proof. see appendix
Here, when issuing debt or shares is necessary, the security holders put just enough to
meet claims : H∗γ = 0. When the profit is large, security holders take away dividends and
leave some ”precautionary reserve” H∗ ≥ 0 . Intuitively, this capital reserve is larger as γ is
large. Conversely, when γ is sufficiently low, this level can be maintained to 0. Indeed, the
derivative of V w.r.t. K for K = 0 can be computed (thanks to the envelop theorem) :
V ′K(0, pi) = F (a
∗(0)) +
∫ npi
a∗(0)
δρV ′(ρ (npi − x) , pi)f(x)dx
+γ (F (b∗(0))− F (npi))
Suppose now that the optimal value is H∗ = 0. This implies that a∗(0) = npi and
b∗(0) = B is defined by :
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 V (0, pi) [1− δF (B)] =
∫ B
−∞
[(npi − x)] f(x)dx+ (γ − 1)
∫ B
npi
[(npi − x)] f(x)dx
γB = δV (0, pi) + npi + (γ − 1)npi
The optimal reserve will be H∗ > 0,if the previous expression of V ′K(0, pi) in which we
take a∗(0) = npi is greater than 1
δρ
. That is :
F (npi) + γ (F (B)− F (npi)) > 1
δρ
In this case the optimal policy can be depicted as follows.
-
x0
-ﬀ -ﬀ
take dividends default
-ﬀ -ﬀ
a∗ A b∗
”wait” issue shares or debt
This issuance and dividend policy can be related to the one defined in De´camps and
al. (2008) on banking market. The main difference is that, in their continuous framework,
default never optimally occurs.
When γ is large enough the value function as a function of K has a concave part for
small values of K.
Another interesting question concerns the variation of the default threshold b∗(K)when
γ increases. We know that :
b∗(K) = δ
γ
V (0, pi) +K +npi. It is easy to show that V (0, pi) is decreasing with γ,so that
we have the following proposition :
Proposition 2 When the opportunity cost γ increases, both the precautionary reserve H∗
and the probability of default increase.
Proof. see appendix
A simple consequence of this proposition is that the level of permanent capital is not
a signal of better solvency risk of the insurer. The precautionary reserve is not aimed at
diminishing the risk of insolvency but at diminishing the cost of recapitalization.
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2.2. Optimal First Best reserve policy
In the previous section, when deciding the reserve policy, shareholders don’t take into
account the impact of this policy on the welfare of policyholders. A natural question would
then be to find the optimal policy, (premium, dividends, reserves) under the constraint that
the insured achieve a given per-period level of expected utility u. As a consequence, the
premium is now endogenous. This provides the company a new instrument and introduces a
trade off between capital reserve and premiums as in Bourle`s (2007). In a perfect information
framework, this situation (optimal policy under some reservation level for the insureds), can
be considered as a good candidate for a competitive equilibrium. We examine here the case
γ = 1.
The problem now is hence the following :
V FB(K, u) = max
I,k(.),pi
∫
I
− k(x)f(x)dx+
∫
I
δV FB(ρ (A− x+ k(x)))f(x)dx
s.c.
∫
I
u(w − pi)f(x)dx+
∫
IC
u
(
w +
K − x
n
)
f(x)dx ≥ u
(8)
That is :
V FB(K, u) = max
I,H(.)≥0,pi
∫
I
(K + npi − x) f(x)dx+
∫
I
(
δV FB(H(x), u0)− 1
ρ
H(x)
)
f(x)dx
s.c.
∫
I
u(w − pi)f(x)dx+
∫
IC
u
(
w +
K − x
n
)
f(x)dx ≥ u
(9)
As previously setHFB = arg max δV FB(H, u)− 1
ρ
H and δW FB = max δV FB(H, u0)− 1ρH
And then :
V FB(K, u) = max
I,pi
∫
I
(K + npi − x) f(x)dx+
∫
I
δW FBf(x)dx
s.c.
∫
I
u(w − pi)f(x)dx+
∫
IC
u
(
w +
K − x
n
)
f(x)dx ≥ u
(10)
Let λ be the lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint. Optimization with
respect to pi gives :
(n− λu′(w − pi))µ(I) = 0
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Set I = (0, b], when total loss is larger than b,then the security holders provoke default.
The derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t.b is :
L(b) ≡ (K + npi − b)+ δW FB + λ(u(w − pi)− u(w + K − b
n
))
(11)
It is easy to see that L(b) is a convex function with a minimum for b such that
λ
n
u′
(
w + K−b
n
)
= 1, that is precisely b = K + npi. This minimum is exactly δW FB. This
value being essentially positive we can conclude that L(b)is always positive, and hence :
V FB(K, u0) = K + npi − e+ δW FB (12)
with : u(w − pi) = u
As δρ < 1, arg max
H≥0
δV FB(H, u0) − 1ρH = 0 : the optimal policy is again to maintain
cash reserves to zero, and hence :
V FB(K, u0) = K +
(npi − e)
1− δ
with : u(w − pi) = u
As
F (b∗(0))(npi − e0)
1− δF (b∗(0)) ≥
(npi − e)
1− δ , the next proposition holds.
Proposition 3 The First Best policy implies recapitalization in situations where it is not
the (private) optimal behavior for security holders. Therefore, an insurer has a short term
incentive to deviate from this First Best policy by provoking default. This makes the First
Best allocation unstable even if the policyholders perfectly observe the level of reserve capital.
2.3. Credibility : second best policy
The optimal First Best policy cannot be non cooperatively implemented since there
is no way for the shareholders to commit to recapitalize when losses are larger than the
expected present value of future income. An interesting question would be to find a second
best credible policy. In this second best world, capital allows to commit to some default
probability.
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Endogenously, shareholders provoke default when the present value of future income is
less than the claims, that is when x is larger than K+npi+δW SB, where W SB is the optimal
second best value of the firm.
We hence have :
V SB(K, u) =
∫ K+npi+δWSB
0
(
K + npi + δW SB − x) f(x)dx (13)
with pi the largest value of the premium p such that,
U(K, p) =
∫ K+np+δWSB
0
u(w − p)f(x)dx
+
∫ +∞
K+np+δWSB
u
(
w +
K − x
n
)
f(x)dx ≥ u (14)
with : δW SB = max δV SB(H, u)− 1
ρ
H (15)
The difference with the First Best situation is that I is constrained to be the interval
(0, K + npi + δW SB].This is due to the fact that the decision not to default must be ex ante
credible.
Intuitively increasing K allows to decrease the probability of default which in turn
increases the value of the contract for the policyholders and hence allows an increase of
npi. A natural question is to compare the return of this ”investment” with its cost.
As pi is implicitly defined by 14, we have :.
n
∂pi
∂K
= −nUK
Upi
=
∫ +∞
b
u′
(
w +
K − x
n
)
f(x)dx+ n
[
u(w − pi)− u
(
w − pi − δW
SB
n
)]
f(b)
u′(w − pi)F (b)− n
[
u(w − pi)− u
(
w − pi − δWSB
n
)]
f(b)
,
with b = K + npi + δW SB.
As pi is the largest value providing the level u, Upi is necessarily negative, and then
−nUK
Upi
≥ 0.
We Have hence :
n
∂pi
∂K
≥ (1− F (b))
F (b)
E
[
u′
(
w + K−x
n
)
/x ≥ b]
u′(w − pi) .
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As u is strictly concave and w + K−x
n
≤ w − pi when x ≥ b, we have :
n
∂pi
∂K
≥ (1− F (b))
F (b)
.
Now differentiating 13 gives :
∂V SB
∂K
(K, u) = F (b) + F (b)n
∂pi
∂K
≥ 1.
This investment is profitable if this derivative is greater than 1
ρδ
.
Proposition 4 Supposing W0, b0 and pi0 are solutions of

W =
∫ b
0
(b− x)f(x)dx
b = npi + δW
u(w − pi)F (b) +
∫ +∞
b
u
(
w − x
n
)
f(x)dx = u
(16)
If
F (b0) + (1− F (b0))
E
[
u′
(
w − x
n
)
/x ≥ b0
]
u′(w − b0
n
)
>
1
δρ
(17)
it is optimal to hold positive permanent capital HSB > 0
Proof. Easily proven by supposing that HSB = 0 and minoring ∂V
SB
∂K
(0, u)by F (b0) + (1−
F (b0))
E[u′(w− xn)/x≥b0]
u′(w− b0
n
)
.
On the following picture we represent in the plane (b,W ), the curvesW =
∫ b
0
(b− x)f(x)dx
and u
(
w − b
n
+
δW
n
)
F (b) +
∫ +∞
b
u
(
w − x
n
)
f(x)dx = u. The latter is an increasing curve
with a slope smaller than
1
δ
,
(
=
1
δ
for W = 0
)
and an asymptote b = npi + δW. The
intersection of these two curves give the solution W0, b0,and pi0 if H
SB = 0. Obviously,
W0 < W
FB ≤ W ∗ meaning that the credible proof value of the company is lower than under
the first best policy.
[Figure 3 about here.]
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When the condition of the previous proposition is fulfilled, V (K, u) is a function of K
with a slope greater than 1
δρ
for K = 0, and a slope exactly equal to 1
δρ
for K = HSB.
For K going to infinity, the slope tends to 1as pi tends to pi (and hence
∂pi
∂K
tends to 0).
The asymptote being K + (npi − e) + δW SB, the optimal credible capital reserve can be
represented as follows.
[Figure 4 about here.]
3. Regulation
In this section, we intuitively analyze the possible impact of two possible regulation
schemes: capital requirement (that is the minimal amount of capital insurers have to hold
to continue operating) and State guarantee to recapitalize. As the lack of credibility on
recapitalization has been show to be the main issue in reserve policy, the second option may
be preferable.
3.1. The impact of minimal capital requirement
Let us first examine the possible implications of capital requirement on optimal capital
reserve. Such a regulation rule (chosen in most countries) constraints the insurance compa-
nies to hold a minimal amount of capital K. In our setting, this implies that recapitalization
is needed as soon as claims exceed assets minus this ceiling K (and therefore, more often
than without regulation, for a given amount of initial capital). Moreover – under this scheme
– when new shares (or debt) have to be issued, security holders need to build up capital re-
serve up to the required minimum (and no longer up to zero). As, the amount of capital
shareholders are willing to inject are still bounded by the present value of future returns
these two mechanisms that (i) increases the need for recapitalization and (ii) potentially
reduce the value of company, may lead to a perverse effect of capital requirement through
an increase in the probability of default. Lastly, it appears that capital requirement may
reduce the potential amount of ”precautionary reserve” (by imposing early recapitalization)
that could – as shown in Proposition 2 – reduce the cost of recapitalization.
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The exact implication of reserve requirement (in particular on the value of capital)
however remains to be investigated and calls for further research. The analyze of the precise
constrained program would for example allow us to discuss more precisely the impact of
capital requirement on the value of the firm and to provide some interesting comparative
statics on K. Our analysis moreover seems to call for the study of an alternative policy
that would consist in fixing a minimum amount of capital above which security holders
are prevented to take dividend but do not constrain them to recapitalize above zero (when
claims exceed assets). Such a policy would create precautionary reserves without increasing
the need for recapitalization.
3.2. A solution to the credibility issue: State guarantee to recapitalize
The questionable efficiency of capital requirement and the fact that the first best policy
cannot be implemented because of a credibility issue lead us to consider an alternative form
of regulation: State guarantee to inject capital. We have shown in this paper that default
occurs when security holders are reluctant to inject enough capital for the company to keep
on operating. This issue will therefore be solved if the State commits – in these cases – to
buy enough shares for the capital reserve not to be negative.
This however creates a typical moral hazard issue as it will then be easy for the share-
holders to cheat on there capacity/willingness to add capital. They we then benefit from
the capital injected by the government without bearing the costs. This issue however dis-
appears if we assume that government can infer the value of the company and can be eased
by assuming that the State conditions its intervention to a takeover of the company. Such a
nationalization would lead to a null value of the company (from the point of view of share-
holders). Therefore the call for State capital would only be optimal if the amount of needed
capital exceed the value of the company.
4. Conclusion
We highlight in the paper to role of the relationship between an insurer and its security
holders in the need for capital and default regulation. We show that beside the informational
issue between an insurer and its policyholders, regulation can be needed to solve an issue of
credibility on recapitalization. It indeed appears in our work that the first best policy is not
credible as it induces recapitalization in situation where shareholders have no incentive to
inject capital.
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Contrarily to existing literature we moreover show that an interior solution for capital
reserve can be optimally chosen if recapitalization is costly. When the capital market is
frictionless, that is when issuing new debt is costless, the optimal strategy consists in taking
dividend as long as it is possible – because of agency cost – and to recapitalize each time
it is needed (provided the future value of the company is larger than the invested capital).
However, if issuing new debt is costly, it can be optimal to leave some capital in the company.
The optimal strategy then consists in (a) taking dividend above a bottom limit, (b) neither
take dividend nor issue new debt if the ex-post capital reserve is positive but below the limit
and (c) issue new debt in order to meet claims when the current reserve is insufficient.
Taking into account the effect of default on policyholders, we show that the first best
policy implies no default but no capital reserve. This policy however appears to be hardly
implementable as it implies an ex-ante commitment to recapitalize which is not credible.
An efficient regulation would therefore consist in making this commitment credible and
therefore State commitment to recapitalize may be a more efficient regulation than capital
requirement.
Is left for future research to analyze more precisely the optimal regulation. It would
for example be interesting to evaluate optimal capital policy under capital requirement that
is if capital reserve are constrained to be above a given level. We would then be able to
define more exactly the efficient regulation. An other extension of interest would consist in
studying the value of a share (and not of the company). Such a variant of our model may
create an incentive for positive reserve (even with costless capital) as recapitalization – that
is the issuance of new shares – would reduce the value of an existing share.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Proof of Lemma 1
We have
{
δW ∗ = δV (H∗, pi)− 1
ρ
H∗ ≥ δV (H∗γ , pi)− 1ρH∗γ
δW ∗γ = δV (H
∗
γ , pi)− γρH∗γ ≥ .δV (H∗, pi)− γρH∗
Summing up these two inequalities gives :
γ − 1
ρ
H∗ ≥ γ − 1
ρ
H∗γ
Moreover S(γ) = max
H≥0
δV (H, pi) − γ
ρ
H is the supremum of decreasing affine (and hence
convex) functions. It is hence a convex decreasing function, such that S ′(γ) = −H
∗
γ
ρ
(almost
everywhere).
5.2. Proof of Proposition 1
We have :
V (K, pi) = max
H(x)≥0,I
∫
I
[
δV (H(x), pi)− α(x)1
ρ
H(x) + α(x) (A− x)
]
f(x)dx (18)
With α(x) = 1 if H(x) < ρ (A− x) and α(x) = γ if H(x) > ρ (A− x)
take H∗(x)the optimal policy and define :
I1 = {x,H∗(x) < ρ (A− x)} , I2 = {x,H∗(x) = ρ (A− x)} , I3 = {x,H∗(x) > ρ (A− x)}
We have :
V (K, pi) =
∫
I1
[
δV (H∗(x), pi)− 1
ρ
H∗(x) + (A− x)
]
f(x)dx (19)
+
∫
I2
δV (H∗(x), pi)f(x)dx (20)
+
∫
I1
[
δV (H∗(x), pi)− γ
ρ
H∗(x) + γ (A− x)
]
f(x)dx (21)
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Clearly in I1, H
∗(x) = min(ρ (A− x) , H∗), and in I3, H∗(x) = max(ρ (A− x) , H∗γ).
This in turn implies that :
V (K, pi) = max
a≤b≤A≤x
∫ a
−∞
[δW ∗ + (A− x)] f(x)dx (22)
+
∫ b
a
δV (ρ (A− x) , pi)f(x)dx (23)
+
∫ x
b
[
δW ∗γ + γ (A− x)
]
f(x)dx (24)
In order to find H∗ and H∗γ it is helpful to compute the first derivative of V Thanks to
the envelop theorem we have :
V ′K(K, pi) =
∫
I∗
α∗(x)f(x)dx
Where we define α∗(x) by :
α∗(x) = 1 if x ≤ a∗
α∗(x) = γ if x ≥ b∗
α∗(x) = δρV ′K(ρ (A− x) , pi) if a ≤ x ≤ b
This implies that V ′K(K, pi) is smaller than γ,and then that δV
′
K(K, pi)is smaller than
δγ.which is smaller than γ
ρ
This means that H∗γ = 0. and hence that b
∗ = A and W ∗γ = V (0, pi)
Under the optimal cash policy the company issues new shares only in case of negative cash,
that is only when claims are greater than reserves A.
Then the set of equations characterizing the solution of the problem are :
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V (K, pi) =
∫ a∗
−∞
[δW ∗ + (K + npi − x)] f(x)dx
+
∫ A
a∗
δV (ρ (K + npi − x) , pi)f(x)dx
+
∫ b∗
A
[δV (0, pi) + γ (K + npi − x)] f(x)dx
δV (ρ (K + npi − a∗) , pi) = δW ∗ + (K + npi − a∗)
δV (0, pi) + γ (K + npi − b∗) = 0
W ∗ = max
H≥0
(
δV (H, pi)− 1
ρ
H
)
5.3. Proof of Proposition 2
We know that :
V (K, pi) = max
a≤A≤b
∫ a
−∞
[δW ∗ + (K + npi − x)] f(x)dx
+
∫ A
a
δV (ρ (K + npi − x) , pi)f(x)dx
+
∫ b
A
[δV (0, pi) + γ (K + npi − x)] f(x)dx
Thanks to the envelop theorem the derivative of V with respect to γ is hence :
V ′γ(K, pi) =
∫ b∗(K)
A
[
δV ′γ(0, pi) + (K + npi − x)
]
f(x)dx.
In particular :
V ′γ(0, pi) =
∫ b∗(0)
A
[
δV ′γ(0, pi) + (npi − x)
]
f(x)dx,
which gives :
V ′γ(0, pi) (1− δ (F (b∗(0))− F (A))) =
∫ b∗(0)
A
(npi − x) f(x)dx,
which implies V ′γ(0, pi) ≤ 0
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Fig. 1.— On the suboptimality of ”automatical” recapitalization
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Fig. 2.— The value of a company holding capital K
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Fig. 3.— The credibility proof value of the firm
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Fig. 4.— The second best capital reserve
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